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QUASI IN REM ON THE CYBERSEAS
DAVID F. FANNING*
INTRODUCTION
As a symbol of modern society's emergence into the next
millennium, the Internet is second to none. It represents one of the
purest applications of a principle fundamental to all civilized societies:
the free access and dissemination of information. Never before has it
been easier to share news with a friend, whether you are across town
or around the world. Never before has it been easier to transact
business with so many individuals world-wide at such minuscule cost.
But attendant to all of the positive aspects of instantaneous and
practically cost-free communication, is the opportunity for its
exploitation.
A. Pirates on the Cyberseas
The fear is obvious after only a cursory examination of common
electronic communications, data transfers, or business transactions:
what happens if this electronic communication leads to an injury that
has no redress in a convenient forum, or for that matter, in any forum
whatsoever? A hypothetical example clearly illustrates the conun-
drum.
Party X, an individual or corporation of some unknown, possibly
foreign, nation owns and operates a Web site called
MyKindaMusicOnline.com' which is designed for the purpose of
engaging in electronic commerce-in this case, the electronic
transmission of originally created works of music in MP3 format.
Party Y, a citizen of the United States, happens upon MyKindaMusic-
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2001; B.A.,
Political Science and Psychology, St. Norbert College, 1997. The author would like to thank
Professor Kent Streseman, Dean Henry Peritt, Jr., Professor Margaret Stewart, Professor Joan
Steinman, and Professor Richard Warner, for comments on earlier drafts of this Note. The
author thanks especially his parents, Reginald and Mary Fanning, for their continued and
ubiquitous support.
1. As of the date of publication, the domain name MyKindaMusicOnline.com has not
been registered.
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Online.com, listens to several music samples, likes what he hears, and
contracts for the purchase of one song. The instructions on the Web
site direct Party Y to enter his e-mail address so that the song, an
electronic file, can be attached to an e-mail message addressed to
Party Y. The instructions also order Party Y to enter his credit card
number for payment purposes.
2
After two days of checking his Hotmail account, Party Y has
received no message with the file attachment, prompting him to visit
MyKindaMusicOnline.com again to inquire about his order.
Unfortunately, MyKindaMusicOnline.com does not offer a telephone
number for its customer service department, but instead, instructs its
customers to contact the customer service department via e-mail.
Party Y sends an e-mail to the address provided, but gets no response.
Party Y performs a Whois3 lookup, which lists the domain name
registrant as John Doe, residing at 100 Nowhere, USA-an obviously
fictitious name and address. The registration information also
includes an e-mail address, but it is the same address listed on
MyKindaMusicOnline.com. Ten days after Party Y had placed the
order, he attempts to log onto MyKindaMusicOnline.com in order to
find any other information regarding the Web site, but his attempt to
log on fails because the domain name is no longer in use. Party Y
finds only a message from the free Web-hosting service on which
MyKindaMusicOnline.com was hosted saying that the address
entered could not be found. Party Y is out the purchase price of the
music, and he has no information about the party who has wronged
him. What does Party Y do from here?
B. The Problem
This question involves two significant problems. First, how can
Party Y identify Party X now that all of his efforts to do so have
failed? Second, even if Party Y can identify the registrant and
putative operator of MyKindaMusicOnline.com, if that person or
corporation is located outside of the United States or in some state
which is inconvenient for the plaintiff, Party Y must find an
2. See infra note 16 (regarding alternate payment systems).
3. A Whois lookup is a program which allows users to search several domain name
databases, including the database of Network Solutions, Inc., for the identity and contact
information of a domain name registrant. Several examples of the Whois program are located
at http://www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois; http://www.allwhois.com/; and
http://swhois.net/; http://www.whois.net/; http://www.samspade.org/.
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alternative forum that could constitutionally assert jurisdiction over
the matter.
Ever since International Shoe v. Washington,4 the assertion of
jurisdiction in U.S. courts has been predicated upon the satisfaction of
the minimum contacts test: "due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."5 A U.S. court
could assert general personal jurisdiction6 over Party X only if Party
X had established contacts with the forum state that were
"continuous and systematic,"7 a bar that the Court has set fairly high.8
The rationale is that the defendant's contacts with the state are "so
substantial and of such a nature" that the forum is justified in
asserting jurisdiction even where the underlying cause of action is
unrelated to the defendant's contacts. 9
U.S. courts may, in the alternative, assert specific personal
jurisdiction over a party where the cause of action arises from or is
related to the party's contacts with the forum. 0 The rationale for this
limited form of jurisdiction is that the relationship "among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation"'" gives the defendant "fair
warning that a particular activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of
a foreign sovereign.""l So how does this all solve Party Y's problems?
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The plaintiff, the state of Washington, sued the defendant, a shoe
company, for nonpayment of a sum assessed in pursuance to a state unemployment
compensation tax. See id. at 312. The Supreme Court of Washington had held that because the
defendant's contacts were regular and systematic, the law regarded the defendant corporation
as present and doing business in the state, such that the assertion of jurisdiction was
constitutional. See id. at 314. The United States Supreme Court upheld the state court ruling
on grounds that there existed "sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it
reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice,
to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there." Id. at 320.
5. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
6. The distinction between general and specific jurisdiction was first identified by Arthur
T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1135-45 (1966). The
Supreme Court did not formally recognize this distinction until 1984. See Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
7. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952).
8. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 630
(1988) (suggesting that exercise of general jurisdiction is rare).
9. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 6, at
1121, 1144 (discussing general jurisdiction).
10. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 372-73 (1985).
11. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
12. Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
20011
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Applying these traditional bases of personal jurisdiction, whether
general or specific, to potential defendants whose contacts are wholly
online has been difficult; clear guidelines from recent case law
confronting the issue of personal jurisdiction on the Internet are
somewhat elusive. 3 What does seem fairly clear is that the kind of
13. What appears at first to be a workable rule was obtained in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo
Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). The court suggested that the "likelihood that
personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Id. at 1124. This
suggests a "sliding-scale" analysis of contacts and interactivity. At one end of the scale are
situations in which the defendant clearly does business through a Web site or other online
forum. See id. The Zippo court cited CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.
1996), for an example of this kind of interactivity. In CompuServe, the defendant contracted
with the plaintiff, a forum resident, to distribute computer files, which the defendant uploaded
to the plaintiff's forum computers. See id. at 1260. The Sixth Circuit held that defendant had
purposefully directed his business activities to the forum through his deliberate and repeated
transmission of files to the forum state. See id. at 164-66. The Zippo court described the
opposite side of the interactivity scale by reference to Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.
Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In Bensusan, concerning a trademark infringement claim, see id. at
297, the defendant's Web site was merely passive; the defendant's Web site contained the
infringing mark and general information about the defendant's club, but it was not interactive in
that users would have to call the club to order tickets. See id. The Bensusan court held that the
defendant had not "reached out" to or maintained contacts with the forum; thus, minimum
contacts on which to assert jurisdiction did not exist. Id. at 301. The Zippo court suggested that
the middle ground of the sliding-scale was occupied by cases like Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,
847 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). In Maritz, the defendant created a Web site for the
purposes of maintaining a registry of electronic mailboxes, to which he would forward
advertisements for products that matched the registrants' interests. See id. at 1330. The Maritz
court held that, even though the Web site was not yet operational, it amounted to "active
solicitations" and "promotional activities" designed to "develop a mailing list of Internet users"
and that the defendant made no effort to refrain from responding to users from any particular
state; thus, defendant's contacts were sufficient for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Id. at
1333-34. This sliding-scale of interactivity provides, at least, a starting point for an analysis of
Internet personal jurisdiction.
Several courts have refrained from asserting general personal jurisdiction where the
contact with the forum occurred only via a Web site. See Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. Sunamerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258
(N.D. I11. 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997); Graphic Controls Corp.
v. Utah Med. Prods, Inc., No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 W.L. 276232 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 1997);
McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1826 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
For a discussion of cases dealing with online contacts and torts, see Remick v. Manfredy,
52 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that defendant's Web site containing order form for
the sale of goods delivered by mail was passive and insufficient to support general jurisdiction);
Grutkowski v. Steamboat Lake Guides & Outfitters, Inc., No. 98-14531998, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20255 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1998) (holding that defendant's passive Web site constituted
neither continuous nor systematic contacts upon which to support general jurisdiction for a
product liabilities claim); Bush v. Tidewater Marine Ala., Inc., 1:97C875, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7120 (N.D. Ill. April 24, 1998) (holding that defendant's Web site, without more, was insufficient
to confer general jurisdiction); Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97-C8745, 1998 WL
246152 (N.D. Ill. April 27, 1998) (holding defendant's contacts, a passive Web site and a
continuing relationship with a forum dealer, were sufficient contacts to support specific
jurisdiction over product liability claim); Mayo Clinic v. Jackson, No. 05-98-002225-CV, 1998
WL 699385 (Tex. App. Oct. 9, 1998) (holding that defendant's contacts, national publications
and a passive Web site, as well as the treatment of over 1000 residents of the forum state and
other contacts, supported general jurisdiction); see also Harbuck v. Aramco, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-
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contact between our Party X and Party Y above may not support
personal jurisdiction in some forums. The key factor is that because
Party X does not have knowledge of Party Y's geographic location,14
our traditional jurisprudence of jurisdiction based upon meaningful
contact directed toward the forum may preclude any forum from
constitutionally asserting personal jurisdiction over Party X.15 But
1971, 1999 WL 9999431 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1999) (holding that defendant's Web site, which
contained only advertising information and a toll-free number and e-mail address, was passive
and did not support general jurisdiction); Brown v. Geha-Werke GMBH, No. 298-2605-18, 1999
WL 803750 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 1999) (holding the same); Broussard v. Deauville Hotel Resorts,
Inc., No. 98-3157, 1999 WL 621527 (E.D. La. Aug. 13,1999) (holding the same).
14. See Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, Internet Web Site Activities of Nonresident Person or
Corporation As Conferring Personal Jurisdiction Under Long-Arm Statutes and Due Process
Clause, 81 A.L.R. 5th 41 (2001).
15. Perhaps the majority of those courts that have chosen to follow the analysis set out in
Zippo would characterize our hypothetical site, www.MyKindaMusicOnline.com, as "highly
interactive," since users may not only learn about products for sale, but also purchase the same
goods without any additional means of communication. Such a holding would countenance,
then, an assertion of jurisdiction over Party X if the claim were related to the extant
interactivity. However, because the Zippo analysis has not yet been adopted by all courts,
including the Supreme Court, the question of the constitutionality of such an assertion of
jurisdiction lingers.
Notice that the language employed by the Zippo court, see supra note 13, most probably by
design, mirrors the language that is traditionally used in the analysis of personal jurisdiction-
the so-called minimum contacts test: "whether due process is satisfied must depend ... upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws"
related to the activity. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). However,
the two formulations (Zippo and International Shoe) bear an important difference. Where the
Zippo analysis considers the commercial nature of the Web site and the level of possible
activity, the minimum contacts test analyzes actual and knowing contacts between the defendant
and the forum resident in relation to the claim. Central to the traditional analysis is whether the
defendant knew at the time of the contact that his activities would affect interests within the
forum. "Quality" and "nature," then, modify not only the contacts between the plaintiff and
defendant, but also the relevant accumulated contacts' relation to the forum. The
characterization of that relationship must take into consideration the role forum law plays in the
kind of activity in which the defendant has already engaged. The central issue is the defendant's
purposeful activities, which seek out and rely upon forum rules for the very game he or she is
playing.
On the other hand, of course, it is not difficult to recognize how a site's high degree of
interactivity may or should put the Web site on notice that its customers might one day file suit
against the site based upon claims that arise from online activity. Certainly, the Web site
(proprietor) understands that at on the other end of the line exists a person who resides in a
forum somewhere. However, even where a Web site is highly interactive, as is our hypothetical
site, such activity is not, by the very nature of the Internet, absent substantive content that
specifically identifies a person or place, targeted at any one particular state. Rather, most Web
sites are wisely "directed" at all IP addresses everywhere (where such direction derives from a
conscious effort to minimize access barriers). There lies the conundrum. In response, the Zippo
analysis implicitly requires that where the defendant/Web site proffers no evidence of its efforts
to tailor its activity in a manner designed to limit its amenability to litigation in a foreign forum,
the assertion of jurisdiction should be consistent with the Web site's reasonable expectations,
and in turn, with the requirements of due process.
Notice, however, that this shifts a significant burden to the defendant. In effect, the
defendant must prove a negative-that he or she has no contact with the forum. By the Zippo
analysis, evidence that the Web site did not specifically target the forum would be insufficient.
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often an even more important practical matter is how to identify and
draw a party to the courthouse in order to initiate the litigation
process. Is Party Y out of luck? In what forum may he be made
whole? 1
6
C. The Solution May Involve Property
In order for Party X to contract business through an Internet
Web site, she must first register for an electronic address on which to
set up shop, much the same as would a telemarketing firm first
procure a phone bank capable of placing or receiving calls.
Registration for this domain name ostensibly entitles her to the use of
the electronic address, to the exclusion of anyone else. This domain
Several other courts, however, have limited the analysis to those contacts that the defendant has
actually initiated or allowed. See Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music L.P., 33 F. Supp.
2d 907 (D. Or. 1999); Rothschild Berry Farm v. Serendipity Group L.L.D., 84 F. Supp. 2d 904
(S.D. Ohio 1999). Still, these corrections do not address the fundamental issue, that, at the
outset, many online commercial actors direct their online activity to no single forum.
With regard to the ability to identify individual users (which, incidentally, would implicate
serious privacy concerns), to date there is no reliable and inexpensive technology that allows a
Web site operator to discern the location of a user who has logged onto its site. However, new
technologies have recently come into the market that allow a Web site to collect substantial
information about user habits, and the credit card charge-back system or communication with a
willing Internet Service Provider may, with some effort, reveal the location of a user, especially
if he or she has transmitted bona fide credit card information. To the extent a Web site
operator must purchase or develop software suitable for the purpose of geographic location, this
would represent a significant outlay of capital which is inconsistent with many of the business
models prevalent in the market today. Such a significant expense would undoubtedly prevent
an entire class of Web entrepreneurs from engaging in Internet commerce (as would the
looming specter of the Web site's nationwide amenability to litigation). Without the technical
ability to block users from specific geographic locations, a simple notice on a Web site limiting
the site's automated services to users who reside in a particular state would be wholly illusory,
especially in light of the extraordinary and sophisticated methods Napster users have employed
in circumventing that site's efforts to block copyrighted material, efforts which have included
the use of pig Latin and backward spellings of the blocked material. See Canada Firm Uses Pig
Latin to Fool Napster Block, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/internet/03/12/napster.02/ (last
visited July 8, 2001).
Instead of looking primarily at whether a user may consummate a commercial transaction
through the Web site at issue, a better analysis would take into consideration, presumably in the
context of the traditional reasonableness analysis, the financial position of the Web site in
relation to the amount and nature of commercial activity in which the Web site engages. See
infra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
16. In reality, the plaintiff's first avenue for relief is his or her credit card company, which
pursuant to federal law, may not charge more than fifty dollars for an unauthorized charge. See
15 U.S.C. § 1643 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 1693-1693r (1994). In turn, the agency that authorized the
credit card may attempt to "charge-back" thc merchant. However, our hypothetical assumes
that these measures are unavailable. New forms of payment may provide for even greater
anonymity online. For example, the Condor Project is a software system that runs on a cluster
of workstations in order to harness wasted CPU cycles. See The Condor Project Homepage, at
http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2001). Perhaps sometime in the future
Internet users may have the ability to exchange unused CPU cycles for digital products, like that
which our hypothetical Party X has purchased.
[Vol. 76:1887
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name, because it represents value to the registrant, constitutes a
property right. But then, if the domain name is indeed property,
where is it located? If one could ascertain the location of the domain
name, then there may be a possible cause of action quasi in rem
against that property itself.
A traditional action quasi in rem is based on no contact or
relation between the defendant and forum other than the defendant's
ownership of forum-property. 7 The resulting judgment award is
limited to funds derived from the court's disposition of the attached
property; the property owner is not personally liable for anything
more than the attached property. 8
Unfortunately, jurisdiction in the nature of quasi in rem has been
severely limited by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v.
Heitner19 which held that even the assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction must derive from an analysis of the defendant's contacts
as set forth in International Shoe. However, as this Note will
articulate, one may plausibly read Shaffer as preserving the assertion
of quasi in rem jurisdiction in certain limited situations analogous to
the hypothetical controversy described above.
In Part I, this Note will describe and discuss the Internet, domain
names, and domain name registration with the domain registrar. Part
II contains an analysis of current law and theory regarding whether a
domain name can be properly characterized "property." Part III
briefly describes the development of in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction and argues for its modern justification. Part III also
discusses some important factors which may limit the practical
applications of an action quasi in rem against a domain name.
I. THE INTERNET, DOMAIN NAMES, AND NSI REGISTRATION
Very few would refute the contention that the Internet is the
fastest growing method of communication today. What was first
established as a military program designed for the defense
department as a system of redundant channels of communication that
could survive partial destruction, 0 has blossomed into a public forum
17. See, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
18. See, e.g., Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 187-88 (1886).
19. 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977) ("We therefore conclude that all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its
progeny.").
20. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The original program was called ARPANET,
an acronym for the network developed by Advanced Research Project Agency. See id. at 850
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for practically any expression imaginable.2' This expression most
often takes the form of Web pages: complex electronic, often
interactive, documents stored in different computers all over the
world.
22
Web surfers, those who browse the Internet for material of
interest to them, may find the material for which they are looking in a
variety of different ways. The most common method is to enter a
series of search terms into a Web browser, 23 software installed on a
personal or network computer, which searches the Internet for Web
pages that contain the same or similar terms.24 The Web browser
provides the user with a list of hits that when selected, will
automatically transmit a message to the computer that contains the
Web page. This list is comprised of domain names, i.e., names of
Web sites. In response to the electronic request, the Web server
transmits to the user the requested Web page or pages.
Another method of requesting material from the Web involves
manually typing the domain name into the Web browser as if dialing
a telephone number. Because searches often yield thousands of
possible matches, Web operators much prefer this method in that it
presents the user with only a single operator's Web page, singled out
from the myriad of other competing Web pages.21 Consequently,
Web operators much prefer a domain name that users are likely to
deduce from the name of the organization that operates the site.
The vast majority of registrations of domain names, are
performed by Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), a Virginia
n.3.
21. See id. at 853 ("From the publisher's point of view, it constitutes a vast platform from
which to address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions of readers, viewers,
researchers, and buyers.").
22. See id.
23. Examples of these are Netscape, Microsoft Explorer, Yahoo, and Excite. Most Web
browsers offer a number of searching techniques designed to most efficiently direct the user to
the desired information.
24. For instance, a Boolean search produces a list for every search term entered into the
browser, after which only those documents that contain all terms are selected for display to the
user. The results are usually displayed in order of matching strength, which is determined by
the number of times the search terms appear in each document. Another type of engine
searches for documents that contain not only the search terms, but also other types of
characteristics. For example, they can search for tcrm s display.ed in rge]r font than the
majority of the surrounding text or for terms associated with a specific Web page by prevalence
of past use of previous users, a conscious effort by the creator of the Web browser software to
list certain Web sites higher in the list than would naturally occur, ostensibly in exchange for
advertising dollars from the operator of the Web site. See generally PRESTON GALLA, How
THE INTERNET WORKS (1999).
25. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
[Vol. 76:1887
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corporation, although many new registrars are beginning to offer
registration services. 26 NSI was granted a monopoly by the National
Science Foundation, a subordinate office of the U.S. federal
government, for the purpose of establishing a workable and efficient
system of domain name registration.17 In exchange for an initial and
subsequent annual fee, NSI performs two functions: it screens domain
name applications to prevent the registration of identical domain
names, and it maintains a directory which links domain names to their
respective Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses (four groups of digits
which constitute a unique numerical address for every computer
linked to the Internet).28
NSI has instituted a domain name dispute policy which requires
each applicant to verify that the requested domain name does not
interfere with intellectual property rights of a third party.29 If a third
party should present evidence to NSI of a valid trademark
registration that is identical to the registered domain name, and if the
domain name registrant can present no evidence of a pre-existing
right to use the domain name, NSI will cancel the registration. °
II. ARE DOMAIN NAMES PROPERTY?
The recent phenomena of selling domain names for astronomical
prices indicates the obvious, that domain names, at least some, do
indeed represent value.31 But does this mean that domain names are
property, and if so, what kind of property are they? On one hand,
domain names are similar to trademarks, in that they indicate origin
26. See List of Accredited and Accreditation-Qualified Registrars, The Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers, at http://www.icann.org/registrars/accredited-list.html (last
visited May 3, 2001).
27. See id.
28. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 952 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
29. See id. at 953.
30. See id. The court described the resulting dilemma
In short, the exclusive quality of second-level domain names has set trademark owners
against each other in the struggle to establish a commercial presence on the Internet,
and has set businesses against domain name holders who seek to continue the
traditional use of the Internet as a non-commercial medium of communication.
Id.
31. See Anick Jesdanun, Domain Name Prices Online Are Sky High, ST. LOuIS POST-
DISPATCH, Jan. 22, 2000, (Business), at 2. The following domain names and their sale prices
illustrate that domain names can have great value, especially when they are generic:
Business.com, $7.5 million; America.com, $10 million; WallStreet.com, $1 million; and
Autos.com, $2.2 million. Id.; see also Michael White, Domain Name Sale Makes Internet
Entrepreneur Rich, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES, Feb. 2, 2000, at E3 (noting that Altavista.com
sold for $3.3 million).
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and identify goods and services. On the other hand, domain names
play a useful role on the Internet by designating where information is
sent, a process that might appear like the kind protected by patent.
3z
One thing is certain: for a domain name to work properly, it can be
assigned to only one Web site. The exclusive nature of a domain
name is the essential basis of its utility and value. Moreover, domain
name registrants may license, sell, or lease domain names, much like
other types of intangible property.33 If one can determine that
domain names are enough like property to attach or garnish them in a
legal proceeding, one must also determine where the location of this
property lies. Because, in the language of quasi in rem jurisdiction, a
court's enforcement power is only as broad as its territorial
boundaries, where exists the property's res central.
A. Domain Names As Property Rights
Courts have consistently use the term "property" to connote a
wide range of interests that are legitimate objects of protection. 34
Courts routinely cite the Corpus Juris Secundum, which reads:
In the strict or true legal sense, the word "property" signifies
valuable rights or interests protected by law. This is the primary
meaning of the term. Accordingly, in law, it is not the physical
material object which constitutes property, as it does when the term
is defined in its ordinary sense. The term means something more
than the mere thing which a person owns. In its more appropriate
and true legal sense property is not alone the corporeal thing or
physical object itself, and is not alone the land or chattel itself. The
physical objects, although the subjects of property, are, when
coupled with possession, only the indicia, the visible manifestations
of invisible rights.35
32. See Marshall Leaffer, Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual Property:
Domain Names, Globalization, and Internet Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 139, 145
(1998); see also J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy:
Premises for a Restructured Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475
(1995) (discussing the legal hybrid concept); David Streitfeld, On the Web, Simplest Names Can
Become Priciest Addresses, WASH. POST, July 15, 1999, at Al.
33. See Martin B. Schwimmer, Domain Names and Everything Else: Trademark Issues in
Cyberspace, 569 PLI/PAT 381,391 (1999).
34. See Gibbes v. Nat'l Hosp. Serv., 24 S.E.2d 513, 515 (S.C. 1943) ("In modern legal
systems, property includes practically all valuable rights. The term is indicative and descriptive
of every possible interest which a person can have, extends to every species of valuable right or
interest, and comprises a vast variety of rights.").
35. 73 C.J.S. Property § 4 (1983), cited in Lott v. Clausens, Inc., 163 S.E.2d 615 (S.C. 1968);
see also First Charter Land Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 643 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that
"property" refers to both the actual physical object and the various incorporeal ownership rights
in the res, such as the rights to possess, to enjoy the income from, to alienate, or to recover
ownership from one who has improperly obtained title to the res); Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp.
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Important factors which characterize a property right include whether
the thing can be made exclusive to its owner, and whether it is
alienable.3 6 Over the years, courts have held that this can include
accounts receivable,3 7 telephone numbers,38 contractual obligations, 39
and stock certificates. Contractual obligations can as well give rise to
a property interest, with some exceptions.
In general terms, a domain name consists of the right to access a
specific code, which is translatable to letters and numbers listed in
electronic format, i.e., pulses of electricity that turn computer
switches on and off, on the main DNS registry maintained by the
DNS registrar. In other words, somewhere down the line of
electronic communications, the domain name is a collection of
electric energy that resides on a mainframe computer.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 884 P.2d 108 (Cal. 1994) (holding that intangible property is
generally defined as property that is a right rather than a physical object); People v. Kwok, 75
Cal. Rptr. 2d 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that property is something that one has the
exclusive right to possess and use); Dep't of Transp. v. Rogers, 705 So. 2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (noting that "intangible property rights" are a group of rights inhering in a person's
relation to a physical thing, as a right to possess or use, and may arise from contract); Vollmer v.
McGowan, 409 Ill. 306 (1951) (holding that the term "property" is sufficiently comprehensive to
include every interest one may have in any and every thing which is subject of ownership,
together with right to freely possess, enjoy and dispose of property); Lappin v. Costello, 232 Ill.
App. 3d 1033 (1992) (holding that property interests are not created by the Constitution, but by
independent sources such as state law, local ordinance, or mutually explicit understanding);
Dodds v. Shamer, 663 A.2d 1318 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (commenting that "property" is a
term that has broad and comprehensive significance, and which embraces everything that has
exchangeable value or goes to make up a person's wealth-every interest or estate which law
regards of sufficient value for judicial recognition); Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n, 913 P.2d 1322 (Okla. 1996) (holding that "intangible personal property"
encompasses property rights that, though represented by tangible objects, are essentially
incorporeal in that they have limited intrinsic value and ultimately can only be claimed or
enforced by legal action); Smalling v. Terrell, 943 SW.2d 397 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that common law embodies an expansive view of property, and that "property" is said to include
all rights that have value); Adams v. Great Am. Lloyd's Ins. Co., 891 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.
1995) (noting that intangible property has no physical existence, but may be evidenced by
document with no intrinsic value).
36. See South Carolina Dep't Highways and Pub. Transp. v. Balcome, 345 S.E.2d 762 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1986); see also Evers v. Custer County, 745 F.2d 1196 (Idaho 1984) (holding that the
property owner's right to exclude others is a fundamental element of a property right).
37. See Toledo Blank, Inc. v. Pioneer Steel Serv. Co., 98 Ohio App. 3d 109 (1994).
38. See Chicago World's Fair-1992 Corp. v. 1992 Chicago Worlds' Fair Comm'n, Civ. No.
83 C 3424, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14573 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 1983) (protecting use of telephone
number 444-1992 against use of telephone number 434-1992 in context where "1992" had special
significance); see also SODIMA v. Int'l Yogurt Co., 662 F. Supp. 839, 852-54 (D. Or. 1987)
(recognizing common law trademark rights in telephone "number" 800-YO CREAM);
American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. I11. 1985)
(granting American Airlines injunction against travel agency's use of telephone number 1-800-
263-7422, which defendant promoted as 1-800-AMERICAN).




Of course, the physical form of a domain name is not the kind of
property that a sheriff can arrest and deposit in a court's register.
However, as indicated above, property, especially the kind of
property that can be attached or garnished in satisfaction of
judgment, need not be physical in form. Domain names are similar to
stock certificates in that they represent an exclusive right of
ownership, though unlike shares of stock, domain names are not
fungible.
It is fairly clear that domain names are not equivalent to
trademarks (though the two function similarly) and that domain
name registration of a domain name confers no trademark rights
apart from the common law rights created by usage. Moreover,
registration of a domain name does not exempt one from liability for
trademark infringement. 40  While trademarks are generally not
transferable independent of the goodwill they represent, 41 domain
names are clearly alienable.
The process of domain name registration creates a set of
correlative rights between the registrant and the registrar. The
registrant agrees to transmit the domain name to the DNS registry,
the "master list" of all domain names which the several intermediate
registries reference daily; and, the registrant agrees in exchange to
pay an initial and annual fee. This simplistic transmission to the DNS
registry belies the significance and value of the transaction. As
described above, the value of a domain name is a function of the
exclusive nature of domain name registration, which, in turn, allows
the domain name to identify goods and services offered over the
Internet.4
2
The first case that presented the issue of whether a domain name
is property was Umbro v. 3263851 Canada, Inc. ,43 in which the
40. Cardservice Int'l v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 742 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("The terms of the
Lanham Act do not limit themselves in any way which would preclude application of federal
trademark law to the Internet.").
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1060. However, courts have upheld transfers of trademarks where the
purchaser used the mark for goods or services that were similar. See Marshak v. Green, 746
F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984); Visa v. Birmingham, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1982); Raufast
S.A. v. Kicker's Pizzazz, Ltd., 208 U.S.P.Q. 699, 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
42. See Cardservice Int'l, 950 F. Supp. at 741.
[O]nly one party can huld any particular domain name. Who has access to that domain
name is made even more important by the fact that there is nothing on the Internet
equivalent to a phone book or directory assistance. A customer who is unsure about a
company's domain name will often guess that the domain name is also the company's
name.
Id. (citation omitted).
43. See 48 Va. Cir. 139,141(1999).
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plaintiff, an internationally known manufacturer of soccer apparel
and equipment, attempted to satisfy a default judgment against the
defendant, a Canadian corporation that had registered the domain
name "umbro.com" through NSI. The plaintiff sought to garnish the
defendant's "property" held by the registrar, the domain name which
was the subject of the initial trademark infringement claim. In
response to the garnishment procedure, NSI denied that it held
garnishable property of the judgment debtor.44
NSI's main arguments characterized domain names as interests
that are not subject to garnishment proceedings because of two
factors. First, the domain name registrant's rights, as defined by the
registration agreement, are dependent upon unperformed conditions,
namely the duty to indemnify the registrar and the continuing
obligation to maintain an accurate registration record.45 Second, a
forced domain name transfer to a third party would require NSI to
perform services for those with whom it had not contracted.46 In
response to the first argument, the court reasoned that because NSI
had, by its own dispute resolution policy, agreed to the very
conditions this garnishment procedure presented, and because
property may be garnished even if it is subject to liens that affect the
value of the property, the contractual conditions concomitant to the
registration and maintenance of a domain name do not present an
obstacle to the garnishment. 47  With regard to NSI's claim that
garnishment would force them to do business with a party with whom
they have not contracted, the court referred to NSI's general practice
of passive domain name registration and the fact that registration is
accomplished without human interaction in over ninety percent of all
domain name registrations, as evidence that the garnishment
procedure would not significantly burden NSI.48 The court concluded
that because the garnishment procedure "extends to all manner of
property," domain names are subject to garnishment.49
NSI appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, which overturned
the lower court ruling. 0 The Virginia Supreme Court focused on the
44. See id.
45. See id. at 143.
46. See id. at 144.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 145.




fact that the value of the judgment debtor's domain name manifested
only by NSI's continuing provision of service, and that therefore, the
"domain name was a product of a contract for services between the
registrar and registrant."', Citing the general concern that its
approval of domain name garnishment would inextricably lead to
further attempts to garnish every kind of right created by service
contract, 52 the court held that a domain name was not a liability and
was thus not subject to garnishment. 3
But the court's application of the general principle that a
judgment creditor may not "step into the shoes" of the judgment
debtor misreads the context in which the principle has traditionally
obtained. Judicial reluctance to the attachment or garnishment of a
judgment debtor's contractual obligations stems from two concerns
which are similar to those involving claims for specific performance of
a personal services contract: that such an order would require
extensive judicial supervision, and that the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibits involuntary servitude. 54  Neither of these concerns are
present in the attachment of a domain name. As the plaintiff in
Umbro argued, NSI's registration procedure requires very little
human interaction, to say nothing of judicial supervision.55 Indeed,
there is very little that is "personal" about NSI's service contract.
The cancellation or transfer of a domain name can be accomplished
in seconds and with finality. Moreover, even if NSI objected to the
provision of registration services to the judgment creditor on
Thirteenth Amendment grounds, NSI's own Registrar License and
Agreement requires it to transfer any domain name in its rolls to an
alternate registrar upon a valid request from the domain name
registrant. 6 Were NSI subject to a garnishment procedure by a party
51. Id.; see also Dorer v. Arel, No. CIV.A.98-266-A, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13558 (E.D.
Va. Sept. 3, 1999) (deferring plaintiff's motion to compel transfer of domain name until the
parties utilize the dispute resolution policies of NSI).
52. The court gave two examples: a satellite subscription service and a corporate name
administered through the State Corporation Commission. See id. Implicit in the second
example especially is the concern that judicial approval of domain name garnishment would, by
virtue of NSI's then monopoly on domain name regist'ation and the huge bank of domain
names it had registered already, inundate Virginia courts with similar garnishment procedures.
However, since the court's decision, many corporations have begun to offer the same
registration service. See List of Accredited and Accreditation-Qualified Registrars, supra note
26.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., Am. Broad. Cos. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363 (N.Y. 1981).
55. See Umbro Int'l, Inc. v. 3263815 Can., Inc., 48 Va. Cir. 139, 144 (1999); see also
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal 1997).
56. See NS1-Registration License and Agreement, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
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with whom it did not wish to perform registration services, the issuing
court could make the garnishment subject to the judgment creditor's
voluntary transfer of the domain name to an alternate registrar.
Suspension of registration services or outright transfer of a
domain name is consonant with other uses of the procedure,
especially in light of domain name transferability. For example, in
United States v. Global Building Supply, the judgment creditor, a
supplier of drywall materials, attempted to garnish a contractual debt
owed to the judgment debtor, a drywall installer, by a local building
contractor. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the
garnishment procedure on grounds that it granted to the judgment
creditor merely "the right to hold the garnishee liable for the value of
the contract right,"57 and that it did not allow the judgment creditor to
step into the shoes of the judgment debtor. The court reasoned that
garnishment simply warned the holder of property belonging to the
judgment debtor not to transfer the property to the judgment
debtor. 8 Garnishment does not grant a clear and full lien over
property within the garnishee's possession. 9 The court allowed the
judgment creditor's claim for the value of the obligation the garnishee
owned to the judgment debtor, as opposed to the outright grant of the
contractual obligation to the judgment creditor.
Taking this language, then, the attachment of a domain name,
especially in light of the underlying purpose of the hypothetical
controversy between Party X and Party Y, and in light of the
transferability of domain names as part and parcel of every domain
name registered by an accredited registrar, comports with traditional
applications of the same procedure. Even were a court to refrain
from ordering a transfer of a domain name for the reasons expressed
by the Virginia Supreme Court above, the suspension of registration
services, correlated with the transfer of the domain name by the
judgment creditor, aligns with the garnishment procedure in Global
Building Supply. The court would prevent NSI from performing the
continuing registration service. At the same time, the judgment
creditor, by order of the court, would request a transfer of the domain
and Numbers, at http://www.icann.org/nsi/nsi-rla-04nov99.htm#ExhB (last visited Mar. 26,
2001). All registrars accredited by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN") have agreed to the uniform agreement. See id.
57. United States v. Global Bldg. Supply, 45 F.3d 830, 833 (1995).
58. See id. at 833. The original Umbro court used the same language, attributing its
meaning to a literal translation of garnishment from the Norman French word "garnir": to warn.
See Umbro, 48 Va. Cir. at 142 (1999).
59. See Global Bldg. Supply, 45 F.3d at 833.
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name to a different registrar. Such a procedure would grant the
judgment creditor use of the domain name (or the ability to sell it)
while allowing NSI to refrain from offering registration services.
Garnishment would grant to the judgment creditor the same value of
registration services the garnishee owed to the judgment debtor, but
would not transfer the actual obligation itself.
In any event, since the Virginia Supreme Court handed down its
decision, a new federal statute, the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act ("ACPA"), 60 has been enacted. This statute
authorizes a trademark holder to attach an allegedly infringing
domain name for the purposes of in rem jurisdiction. The ACPA
offers the ultimate remedy of forfeiture or cancellation of the domain
name or transfer of the domain name to a prevailing mark owner.6'
Other courts have offered the same remedy in the nature of an
equitable lien against a domain name.62 The most important point for
the purposes of this Note is that domain names do indeed possess
value and display characteristics analogous to traditional property
rights.
B. Domain Names Are Located Where They Are Registered
As the above description of domain names indicates, there is a
good argument that domain names physically exist where they are
registered by virtue of their electronic physical existence. But even
regarding domain names as intangible property, their location is most
likely where the registrar is located. Courts have consistently held
that intangible property has its situs within the district where the
entity controlling the property may be found. For example, in
Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining, Co., the Supreme Court held that
the situs of a stockholder's intangible property interest in corporate
stock is the district in which the corporation is domiciled, since an
order canceling certificates held by the nonresident stockholders is
properly enforceable within the district.63 In Chicago, Rock Island
and Pacific Railway Comp. v. Sturm, the Supreme Court held that the
situs of intangible rights to payment by creditors or financial
institutions is the district in which the debtor or financial institution
60. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1999).
61. See id. § 1125(d)(2)(A), (D)(i).
62. See, e.g., Online Partners.corn, Inc. v. Atlanticnet Media Corp., No. C 98-4146 SI ENE,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 783 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18,2000).
63. 177 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1900); see also McQuillen v. Nat'l Cash Register, 112 F.2d 877 (4th
Cir. 1940).
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may be found.64 Borrowing from Justice Story's famous treatise,
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws,65 Justice McKenna stated that
"considerations of situs are somewhat artificial. If not artificial,
whatever of substance there is must be with the debtor. He and he
only, has something in his hands. That something is the res, and gives
character to the action, as one in the nature of a proceeding in rem."
66
Since it is probable that the domain name registrar would be
subject to personal jurisdiction in the state in which it is found (i.e., its
principal place of business or state of incorporation), the situs of the
domain name itself is most likely in the same location. Were there an
action by a domain name registrant against the registrar (for example,
a claim against the Virginia-based NSI), it is likely that the court
would find little reason to refrain from asserting personal jurisdiction
upon the registrar; the registrar has a definite location within some
forum (i.e., principal place of business, domicile, state of
incorporation, etc.), and most domain name contracts include a forum
selection clause. This clause usually contains language to the effect
that the registrar shall deposit the domain name certificates with the
court in the event of any legal action involving the domain name.
67
These domain name certificates are analogous to stock certificates
and other types of intangible property that represent intangible
rights.
68
64. 174 U.S. 710, 716 (1899).
65. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICr OF LAWS § 549 (8th ed. 1883).
66. Sturm, 174 U.S. at 714.
67. See NSI Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Network Solutions Inc.,
http://www.domainmagistrate.com/dispute-policy.html (last visited April 1, 2000); see also
Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Auths., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 496 (E.D. Va. 1999);
Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
68. See First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Matheson, 246 N.W. 1, 3 (Minn. 1932).
But when debtor and creditor create such a corporeal thing as bearer bonds, they have
created something upon which jurisdiction of any kind may act. They have made more
than mere symbol. They have fabricated a matrix-like container for the property,
wherein it is to be carried from place to place, jurisdiction to jurisdiction, at the will of
the possessor. Mere manual transfer of the container transfers the property itself to
new ownership. The property is so sealed in the container that he who has it must
have the contents.
Id.
This concept of container is analogous to the domain name registration to the extent that
the certificate of registration can be physically placed within the depository of the court.
However, unlike the bearer bonds at issue in First Trust, domain name registration certificates
are created for the express purpose of deposit with the court. See id. Possession of the
certificates by a private individual may not entitle the possessor to the domain name, although a
similar document between the registrant and a third party could convey the interest in the
domain name. But the underlying notion that a legal document could embody the property
right itself is supported by both the creation of the domain name registration certificate for the
purpose of judicial disposition, and by the terms of most domain name registration agreements
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III. THEORIES OF JURISDICTION
A. Brief Historical Background
What we know today as the law of jurisdiction came not from the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, but from traditional international
law.69  More precisely, the rules that governed whether one nation
would enforce the judgment of another nation were international in
nature and obtained by what was called general law.70 Commercial
law, like maritime law, was general in nature in that it developed
independent of state common law, and derived its authority from
international norms, where American states were much more like
separate sovereigns, developing a course of dealings to their mutual
benefit.71 Long before the formation of American states, a vast
course of international dealings naturally created a body of
commercial law that governed commercial intercourse.7" The
Supreme Court referred to this general commercial law in Swift v.
Tyson in holding that it was not bound by a state court ruling
regarding negotiable instruments: "the law respecting negotiable
instruments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero, adopted
by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, to be in a great measure, not the
law of a single country only, but of the commercial world. 73 It was
only natural that sovereign American states adopt this international
law without the added measure of incorporating it into federal law.
74
By this general law, then, the propriety of foreign judgments as a
starting point for the eventual enforcement in a secondary forum
considered two general notions. The first was the concept of notice.
One of the precepts of the conflict of laws is that notice is a
indicating that the registrar will abide by any court order to transfer possession of the domain
name.
69. See Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1073, 1100 (1994).
70. See id. at 1085. English common law was comprised mainly of this general law, which
supposedly represented the customary law of England as a whole. Id. Unlike England,
America lacked a central authority that could utilize general law to provide for the uniformity
of substantive state law. Id.
71. See id. at 1086.
72. See id.
73. 41 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1842) (internal citations omitted). Of coursc, this tension between the
general law and substantive state law would later play out in Erie Railroad Co. v. Topkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938) (reversing Swift on grounds that the application of federal law to a state law
negligence claim was unconstitutional).
74. See Conison, supra note 69, at 1086, 1115. The adoption of general commercial law
without federal incorporation was natural concomitant to the general maxim that "there can be
no common law of the United States." Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834).
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prerequisite to one state's enforcement of another state's judgment.75
Justice Story once stated that "if a civilized nation seeks to have the
sentences of its own courts held of any validity elsewhere, they ought
to have a just regard to the rights and usages of other civilized
nations, and the principles of public and national law in the
administration of justice. 76 Story concluded that "if they choose to
proceed without.., notice to the parties .... it is but just, and
conformable to the rights of other independent nations, to disregard
such sentences as mockeries, and as in no just sense judicial
proceedings. 7 7 As the American state courts analyzed whether or
not to enforce a foreign state judgment, the general international law
of nations, along with the notion of notice, was central. The law of
personal jurisdiction as we know it today was born from this
traditionally international law, as it was applied to notions of comity
among the American states.
78
The second important concept in the propriety of foreign
judgments professed the bromidean sequitur that nations generally
have the power to govern their own affairs. The notion that the
sovereign right of a government to power over all within its
boundaries was firmly recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court much
later in Pennoyer v. Neff . 79 The majority opinion, by Justice Field,
stated three "principles of public law":
(1) that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory....
(2) that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory....
(3) that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its
territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal
established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as
to subject either persons or property to its decisions.
80
Notice, however, that unlike the general international law focus on
notions of comity in the enforcement of foreign judgments, these
principles describe a general theory of state court jurisdiction
75. See Conison, supra note 69, at 1099. Conison suggests that in the first half of the
century, the notice requirement, often cast in terms of natural justice, was not often regarded as
a matter of procedural due process, though this is the modern view. See id. at 1098.
76. Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 3 F. Cas. 1184, 1187 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1793).
77. Id.
78. See John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV.
1015, 1022 (1983).
79. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
80. Id. at 719-20.
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premised upon territorial limits of state power, a shift in the
underlying mode of analysis. The general philosophy behind this
theory was not only derived from an analysis of actual power, but also
predicated upon continental theories of limited power as outlined by
Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws.8' The
Court required first that there be a court of competent jurisdiction,
which was defined by the law of its creation; this is to say that courts
must have subject jurisdiction over the matter.82 For example, it is a
general maxim that the law of the individual states governs the
disposition of property within the state.8 3
Pennoyer was based not only on the principle of state
sovereignty, but also upon notions of due process, in turn, creating a
two step process for determining whether a state had jurisdiction over
a person or his property. The first step, as described above, is the
identification of the person or property to be brought within the
power of the state court. The second step, though only implicit in the
Pennoyer Court's reasoning, involves an analysis of the process that is
due the defendant before he suffers actual deprivation of his
property. The Court described the process due as "rules and
principles which have been established in our systems of
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights." 84
This process is initially validated upon notice of the pendency of the
litigation.85 Notice, then, is merely the first requirement of the
general process due.
The notice requirement with regard to due process and quasi in
rem jurisdiction called for either personal service, or, where only an
interest in property that lies within the forum state was at stake,
attachment of that property.86 Along with substitute service of process
by publication, the attachment of property gave the defendant
sufficient notice of the pendency of the suit.87
81. See STORY, supra note 65.
82. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
83. Id.; see also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 n.14 (1980) (holding that whether
property is garnishabie is a matter of state law); Cargil! v. Sabine Trading, 756 F.2d 224 (N.Y.
1985) (supporting the prejudgment attachment of defendant's property to create jurisdiction as
governed by state law, even if the matter is in federal court); FED. R. Civ. P. 64.
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1. Maritime and Admiralty in Rem and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
These two conflicting interests modulate differently in the
context of maritime law. As part of the general law, maritime law
developed independently of state law.88 Maritime law was, and
largely is still, predicated on the notion that the traditional calculus of
personal jurisdiction in civil actions is incompatible with commercial
activities that are, as in maritime law, uniquely international89 and
where assets are extremely mobile;90 the mobility of assets, in
conjunction with the practical inability to enforce a judgment in a
foreign nation, provides any given plaintiff with only a poor prognosis
of obtaining an adequate remedy.91  Because of these essential
differences from those activities that give rise to traditional civil
actions, maritime law provided for the attachment or arrest of a vessel
so that a plaintiff would have a modicum of security that his or her
claim would not go unanswered and that the judgment would enjoy
the benefit of a forum with the power of enforcement. 92 In the
context of maritime law, the traditional importance of the state's
interest gives way to the national interest in protecting a plaintiff's
claim generally, while still moderately protecting the defendant's
interest in limiting liability to the assertion of jurisdiction to places in
which his or her vessel may be found.
Rule C and B93 actions in admiralty and maritime law are
predicated on nothing more than (in the somewhat incompatible
parlance of personal jurisdiction) the single contact of the owner's
8& See Conison, supra note 69, at 1086.
89. See id. at 1085-86.
90. See Schiffahartsgesellschaft Leonhardt & Co. v. A. Bottacchi S.A. de Navegacion, 773
F.2d 1528, 1537 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cited in George Rutherglen, The Contemporary
Justification for Maritime Arrest and Attachment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 549, 551 (1989);
Polar Shipping Ltd. v. Oriental Shipping Corp., 680 F.2d 627, 637 (9th Cir. 1982); Batiza
Patridge, The Constitutional Challenge to Maritime Seizures, 26 LoY. L. REV. 203, 242-44
(1980).
91. See Joseph J. Kalo, The Meaning of Contact and Minimum National Contacts:
Reflections on Admiralty in Rem and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 59 TUL. L. REV. 24, 32 (1984).
92. See id.; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Sabine Trading & Shipping Co., 756 F.2d 224, 227 (1985)
(suggesting that quasi in rem jurisdiction is a useful tool for securing a future judgment).
93. In rem jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime law can take two forms. First, the
Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rule C, provides, inter alia,
that in rem jurisdiction is available to enforce any maritime lien; jurisdiction is predicated upon
the arrest of any maritime property found within the forum provided that the plaintiff has a lien
on the property attached, either by federal statute or under maritime law. See FED. R. Civ. P.
SuPP. R. C (1). Second, Federal Rule B allows that where in personam jurisdiction does not
exist over a defendant in federal court, plaintiffs may attach the defendant's assets; the court's
jurisdiction is predicated upon attachment of these assets, and the judgment is limited to the
value thereof. See FED. R. CIV. P. SuPP. R. B.
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vessel94 in the forum, even where the presence of the vessel in the
forum bears no relationship to the underlying cause of action.95 This
single contact fits into the existing context of minimum contacts
analysis in that contacts are analyzed in reference to the nation as a
whole.9 6 The significance of maritime and admiralty law to this Note
is the underlying theory that supported maritime law's evolution:
because maritime activities are so different than those activities that
give rise to civil causes of action, a new regime of jurisdiction
jurisprudence must govern causes of action that arise from maritime
activities.
2. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
The history of quasi in rem jurisdiction reaches a time before the
birth of the United States. The attachment of property might have
occurred as early as 250 years ago, as a method of compelling a
defendant to participate in the primitive trial by ordeal. 97 In the early
history of England, anything within the king's physical reach was
subject to his power;98 but, concomitantly, this exercise of jurisdiction
was also limited by the king's enforcement power. 99 As is the case
with foreign judgments generally, foreign nations regarded English
judgments that were reached without an underlying valid assertion of
jurisdiction as void.' °
The tool of outlawry, although expensive and often lengthy, 01
allowed plaintiffs to reach property located in England that was
owned by a party abroad. 12 However, this tool was limited in
94. See David M. Collins, Comments on the American Rule of In Rem Liability, 10 MAR.
LAW., 71, 72 (1985) (describing the personification of the vessel in admiralty in rem cases).
95. To some extent, admiralty law found support for this assertion of jurisdiction from the
traditional use of quasi in rem jurisdiction. See Rutherglen, supra note 90, at 556 n.84
(suggesting that the justification for admiralty arrest and attachment predicated upon civil quasi
in rem and personification of the vessel). This aspect of admiralty in rem and quasi in rem
jurisdiction is not unique to American law. See id. at 558 n.91.
96. See id. at 533 n.69.
97. See Paul D. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 303, 303 (1962) (citing ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL
COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 74-97 (1952)).
98. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup.
CT-. REV. 241, 262-72.
99. David Wille, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Proposed Limits on State
Jurisdiction over Data Communications in Tort Cases, 87 KY. L.J. 95, 152 (1998/1999).
100. See Hazard, supra note 98, at 270 n.102.
101. Nathan Levy, Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common Law and the Power
Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52, 89-90 (1968).
102. See id. at 90.
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application to situations in which the plaintiff could prove that
defendant's absence constituted a conscious effort to avoid service. 103
Generally, though, outlawry was similar to what later developed in
America as an action quasi in rem.1't"
The development of land-based quasi in rem jurisdiction in
America owes much to the development of America itself. During
the first few years of the nascent New World colonies, judgments in
one region of the New World were not readily enforceable in
another.05 The practical solution was to allow a plaintiff to seize
property of the defendant located within the forum, which would
provide the basis for jurisdiction" 6 A prevailing plaintiff could then
satisfy the judgment by further disposition of the seized property. 107
This practice began to proliferate in response to the first economic
depression. 108 As colonists pushed farther west to escape the effects
of the depression (as well as their localized debt), the general
occurrence of loan and credit default increased.09 Often, the hastily
defecting colonists left valuable property behind., 0 Quasi in rem
jurisdiction allowed creditors to obtain at least partial satisfaction of
the debts they were owed."'
Because the modes of communication and transportation were so
rudimentary in colonial America, a strict jurisdictional requirement of
presence or domicile (or personal service, for that matter) would have
left creditors with no real ability to seek and obtain a remedy." 2
Moreover, without the Full Faith and Credit Clause (that would come
only after ratification of the U.S. Constitution), enforcing a judgment
obtained in a separate region of colonial American was as difficult as
enforcing a U.S. judgment outside of the United States is today.
Injured parties were often left with no adequate forum in which to
seek relief. In 1641,113 the passage of the first American quasi in rem
103. Id.
104. See Wille, supra note 99, at 152.
105. See Joseph Kalo, Jurisdiction As an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi in
Rem and in Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1150-62.
106. Kalo, supra note 91, at 33.
107. See Kalo, supra note 105, at 1150-62.
108. Id. at 1155.
109. Id. at 1150-62. The increase in population resulted in decrease of economic and social
cohesiveness. Id.
110. See Michael Mushlin, The New Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction: New York's Revival of a
Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1059, 1066 (1990).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1067.
113. Id. at 1066-67.
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jurisdiction law authorized jurisdiction independent of the common
law system of attachment.1
14
B. International Shoe and the Minimum Contacts Test
In 1945, the Supreme Court decided International Shoe v.
Washington,"5 and in turn, changed the legal landscape of personal
jurisdiction. 116 The new analysis, the so-called minimum contacts test,
would have the effect of broadly expanding state power to adjudicate
over individuals who were not present in the forum state., 7 This
expansion was in response to a rapidly changing society in which
commercial activity increasingly ignored state boundaries." 8 Prior to
International Shoe, commentators called for a reprise from the
Pennoyer rule which many found too restrictive; requiring actual
presence in the forum as a prerequisite for in personam jurisdiction
allowed many would-be defendants to escape liability."9 The
International Shoe Court recognized that advances in transportation
and communication had made it much less burdensome for
nonresident defendants to defend themselves away from home.1
20
The new test took into account both the increasing degree of
interstate activity and the modern advances of legal procedure. The
Court held that because service of process had obviated the use of
traditional physical arrest procedures, due process required only that
the defendant have minimum contacts with the forum state "such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice," for the state to assert jurisdiction over
an out-of-state nonresident defendant.121 This minimum contacts
requirement was culled from the traditional analysis of whether a
corporate entity was "present" in the forum state such that it had
114. See Kalo, supra note 105, at 1158-59.
115. See 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
116. See Mushlin, supra note 110, at 1069.
117. Id. (explaining that after International Shoe, every state in the Union passed a long-arm
statute to qualify for the newly expanded breadth of state court jurisdiction).
11& See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ("Increasing
nationalization of commerce [and] modem transportation and communication system have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
econolnic activity.").
119. See JONATHAN M. LANDERS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 73 (2d ed. 1988); Philip B.
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the in Personam Jurisdiction of the
State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 577-86 (1958); Mushlin,
supra note 110, at 1069.
120. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
121. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
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consented to its jurisdiction. 122 The International Shoe Court held that
this "presence" analysis was better characterized as a minimum
contacts analysis, with an ultimate end of satisfying the requirements
of due process.
The "minimum contacts" component of a now two-step analysis
focuses on whether the defendant has purposefully directed activities
toward the forum.'23 Such activities provide good evidence that the
defendant actually and purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum, where the laws of the forum are
available for its protection. 124 The only relevant factors of analysis in
this regard are those activities attributed to the defendant; "the
unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with the
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum State."'125
The assertion of jurisdiction also modulates by the "quality and
nature" of the contacts in relation to the fair and orderly adminis-
tration of those laws that were enacted to govern the same activity.1 26
Several factors comprise this general reasonableness analysis. The
relationship between the contacts and the legal claim and forum,
where strong enough, provides a due process justification for pulling
the defendant into the forum court: "to the extent that a corporation
exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state," the
party may be brought to enforce the obligations and duties that were
the product of those state contacts. 27 Reasonableness analysis also
takes into account the probable effect on the defendant: the
"inconvenience which would result to the corporation from trial away
from its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this
connection."128
International Shoe was not just a wholesale expansion of state
adjudicatory power; it recast notice requirements as required by due
process.2 9 The Court reasoned that "it is enough that appellant has
122. Id. at 317.
123. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 319.
127. Id.
12& Id.
129. This new analysis of due process and personal jurisdiction has been the source of
considerable confusion, "launching the Court and commentators on a journey into the mysteries
[sic] personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants from which no one has yet returned."
Mushlin, supra note 110, at 1069 n.40; see, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler
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established contacts with the state that the particular form of
substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the
notice will be actual.
'130
In the most general terms, the assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a defendant has come to embody a conflict between two
important interests.131  The first is the defendant's desire and
opportunity to limit its contacts with any sovereign state in such a way
as to limit its liability to the assertion of jurisdiction to only those
jurisdictions in which it intends to avail itself of the benefits and
privileges of that forum.13 The Supreme Court has only recently
characterized this goal as a personal liberty interest,' 33 though the
import of this distinction has quickly permeated the jurisprudence of
personal jurisdiction.
The second important factor is the state's interest in adjudicating
the rights and duties of persons and property that exist within the
state's borders. As discussed above, in the past, the law's recognition
of the state interests was such that a state could assert jurisdiction
whenever the defendant or its property could be found within the
forum. After International Shoe, the minimum contacts test has
provided the arena for the struggle between these two important
interests; the result has been a plethora of cases that delve into the
fact-specific analysis of contacts.
Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxities de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694 (1982); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
130. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
131. See Drobak, supra note 78, passim. Drobak argues that the protection of state
sovereignty should not play a role in the law of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1050.
132. See Flavio Rose, Comment, Related Contacts and Personal Jurisdiction: The "But for"
Test, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1545, 1562 (1994) (suggesting that nonaffiliation is the principle that
justifies rules of personal jurisdiction); Margaret G. Stewart, A New Litany of Personal
Jurisdiction, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 5, 19 (1989) (describing nonaffiliation as basic to our
governmental structure).
133. Since Pennoyer was handed down prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the constitutional source of this personal liberty interest was originally the Fifth Amendment.
See Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 471-72 (quoting International Shoe); see also Ins. Corp. of Ir.,
456 U.S. at 703 n.10. However, courts have held that the Fourteenth Amendment conveys the
same personal liberty interest as did the Fifth Amendment, i.e., the relevant factors spelled out
in International Shoe. See, e.g., Am. Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers
Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d 1449, 1452 n.1 (10th Cir. 1983). The Ireland court explained the
reference in World-Wide Volkswagen to interstate federalism as an expression for the concern
of an individual liberty interest, not of state sovereignty per se. See 456 U.S. at 703 n.10. But
the Court went on to say that the individual liberty interest modulates with the question of state
power to form the bounds of due process. See id. at 712; Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane,
The Exercise of Jurisdiction over and Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 799, 814 n.66 (1988).
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C. Shaffer v. Heitner
1. The Holding
In Shaffer v. Heitner,34 the Supreme Court finally applied the
minimum contacts analysis to state court assertions of quasi in rem
jurisdiction. The Shaffer Court agreed with commentators who
rejected the premise from Pennoyer that "a proceeding against
property is not a proceeding against the owners of that property,"' 35
and argued that "the basis for [in rem] jurisdiction must be sufficient
to justify exercising jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a
thing."' 36 Moreover, the "assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of
the property supports an ancient form without substantial modern
justification.' ' 37
The Court's opinion also included some examples of actions in
rem that might satisfy the minimum contacts analysis by virtue of the
contacts themselves (i.e., the relationship between the forum state,
the defendant, and the litigation) 38 that the ownership of property in
the forum represents. First, "when claims to the property itself are
the source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the
defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is
located not to have jurisdiction.' ' 39 This is so because the defendant
expected to benefit from the state's protection of that interest.
Second, where the cause of action is otherwise related to rights and
duties growing out of ownership of the in-state property, mere
ownership of that property may give rise to jurisdiction. 40
The concurring opinions in Shaffer expressed reservations about
the extent of the majority's holdings. Justice Powell stated that he
would explicitly reserve judgment "on whether the ownership of
some forms of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently
located within a State may, without more, provide the contacts
necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the
extent of the value of the property.' 41 Justice Powell argued that
134. 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977) ("[T]he standard for determining whether an exercise of
jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the
minimum-contacts analysis standard elucidated in International Shoe.").
135. Id. at 205.
136. Id. at 207.
137. Id. at 212.






some assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction, especially involving real
property, should remain a valid method of reaffirming the common-
law traditions that obviate the nebulous minimum contacts test.
142
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion focused on the traditional
use of quasi in rem as a tool for effecting sufficient notice. 143 Justice
Stevens argued that "if I visit another State, or acquire real estate or
open a bank account in it, I knowingly assume some risk that the
State will exercise its power over my property or my person while
there." 144 Justice Stevens distinguished the Delaware statute at issue
in Shaffer on the grounds that those who purchase stock in a public
corporation are not sufficiently on notice that their interest may
become subject to the court of the forum state.145 Indeed, it is entirely
possible that one who purchases securities in a publicly held
corporation may not even have knowledge of that corporation's state
of incorporation, much less of the vagaries of state law to which his or
her interest may be subject. Finally, Justice Stevens suggested a
narrow reading of the majority's opinion, stating that he would "not
read it as invalidating other long-accepted methods of acquiring
jurisdiction over persons with adequate notice of both the particular
controversy and the fact that their local activities might subject them
to suit."'1 46
2. Shaffer's Effect on Maritime Law
Several courts have held that even though the property attached
in Rule C and B admiralty actions may be unrelated to the underlying
cause of action,1 47 Shaffer simply does not apply to maritime arrest or
attachment. But the reasoning behind these holdings varies. Many
courts have held that Rule C admiralty actions (predicated mostly
upon the existence of maritime liens) are supported by a distinct body
of law such that Shaffer is inapplicable.' 48
142. Id.
143. Id. at 217-18.
144. Id.
145. Id.
i46. Id. at 218.
147. See Kalo, supra note 91, at 30.
14& See, e.g., Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Dredge Gen. G.L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.
1981); Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447
(W.D. Wash. 1978) (holding that Shaffer does not affect jurisdiction obtained under admiralty
Rule A attachment). But see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Bay Ridge, 509 F. Supp. 1115 (D.
Alaska 1981) (holding that Rule C violated procedural due process).
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Many courts have held that Rule B actions also survive Shaffer.
In Amoco Overseas v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de
Navigation,149 the Second Circuit stated that "since the constitutional
power of the federal courts is separately derived in admiralty, U.S.
Constitution Art. III §2, suits under admiralty jurisdiction involve
separate policies to some extent." The application of maritime quasi
in rem in Amoco is especially relevant in that the defendant's
property was not a maritime vessel, but rather, funds deposited in a
U.S. bank in connection with the contract, the breach of which gave
rise to the action.150 Thus, to some extent, this kind of maritime quasi
in rem action is extremely similar to its land-based counterpart.
151
Several courts have reasoned that the Shaffer holding is limited to
assertions of state court jurisdiction, as opposed to federal, thereby
making the holding inapplicable to federal maritime quasi in rem.
a5 2
D. The Assertion of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction upon a Domain Name
Comports with Shaffer
1. Contacts
As described above, the current analysis of whether a court
should assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant entails two
inquiries: first, whether the defendant has had minimum contacts with
the forum state such that "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" would not be offended by asserting jurisdiction;
15 3
and second, even if the defendant has established minimum contacts
with the forum, whether it would be unjust for the court to assert
jurisdiction over the defendant, taking into consideration various
factors that courts deem relevant. 154  The Supreme Court has
suggested that even where the defendant has had minimum contacts
149. Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d
648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979).
150. See id. at 650.
151. See Kalo, supra note 91, at 27 n.7, 47. Kalo asserts that "when the claim is unrelated to
the property, the rule B action is facially indistinguishable from the assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction held unconstitutional in Shaffer." Id. at 30-31.
152. See Grand Bahama Petroleum, 450 F. Supp. at 451.
153. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
154. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985).
[T]hus courts in appropriate cases may evaluate the burden on the defendant, the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the
most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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with the forum, an analysis of relevant factors might sway the court
into refraining from asserting jurisdiction over the defendant.155
In analyzing the contacts of a defendant to the forum in the
context of our hypothetical above, we must first struggle with a factor
which heretofore has not been adequately addressed in personal
jurisdiction analysis: what if the defendant is an alien? Where the
defendant is foreign to the nation as a whole, many courts have,
nevertheless, counted its contacts with the specific U.S. state in which
the case had been brought.15 6  However, to some extent, it is not
logical to calculate the individual state contacts of a defendant who is
an alien; 57 our hypothetical defendant, Party X, most likely does not
care about the specific state that she fortuitously contacts.158 In the
realm of international law, the propriety of one nation's assertion of
jurisdiction over the citizen of another nation is gauged by the
contacts that citizen makes with the nation as a whole. 159 Such is not
the case in U.S law, but some commentators suggest that it should
be. 160
A change to a national minimum contacts 61 analysis would better
represent both the foundations of adjudicatory power as derived from
155. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to
litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a
valid judgment.
Id.
156. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
157. See Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal
Jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REV. 470, 475 (1981) (arguing that "[a]n alien having
significant contacts with the United States, but not with any individual state, therefore cannot be
forced to submit to the jurisdiction of any district court under the current scheme").
158. Party X's disinterest in her customer's geographic location is consonant with her
business model. Party X's solicitations and sales (or lack thereof) do not require postal
addresses of customers or postage charges of any kind. The success of Party X's business
depends on how far she can cast her commercial net; her commercial exposure is not limited by
any significant transaction costs whatsoever.
159. This philosophy finds support from the geographic nature of many other nations: the
relatively small size of the majority of nations of the world arguably allows more international
contact than does an amalgamation of many country-sized states (as in the United States).
160. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 133, passim: Note, Fifth Amendment Due Process
Limitations on Nationwide Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B.U. L. REV. 403, 417 (1981).
161. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 133, at 799. Some courts apply a minimum national
contacts standard to cases in which a federal long-arm statute is in use. See id. Degnan and
Kane argue that "[t]o the extent that state boundaries are used to limit the enforceability in the
United States of an American judgment against an alien, we thus may be unnecessarily
restricting its potential enforcement abroad." Id. at 813 n.61. Some courts have applied a
national minimum contacts test to bolster the constitutionality of maritime attachment. See
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traditional notions of sovereignty, and the alien defendant's realistic
intention to avail itself of the benefits and privileges of the forum
nation, in the international sense. 162  Courts 163 that employ the
minimum national contacts test generally find support for this
practice in the Fifth Amendment, as opposed to the Fourteenth
Amendment. 164 Were the net of adjudicatory power cast wider than
just the bounds of Oklahoma or Virginia, the citizens of the United
States would be better protected from online mischief.165
Transatlantic Asiatic Oil, Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1984); Eng'g Equip. Co. v.
S.S. "Selene," 446 F. Supp. 706, 709-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
162. See Rutherglen, supra note 90, at 813. With some jocularity on the Supreme Court's
holding in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), Rutherglen
comments that
[i]n the international order, there is no such thing as Oklahoma.... It is a fabled land
in a musical comedy, where the corn grows as high as an elephant's eye and wind goes
sweeping across the plain.... Yet Oklahoma, even if not a state in the international
sense, does have courts. It is true that some are federal and some are state, and their
restrictive spheres are sharply defined. But in a world order of things, those are simply
American courts. How we choose to distribute our judicial business by either
geography or subject matter is our own business, and further, is a matter as to which
Germany and Japan are profoundly disinterested. If the Japanese courts ever are
asked to enforce a judgment against Asahi, their question would be: "Is this a valid
American judgment?," not whether it would be valid internally within the United
States.
Id.
The holding in Asahi, that the defendant did not have minimum contacts with the forum,
was grounded on the defendant's lack of purposeful availment or contacts directed anywhere.
See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, commented in a footnote
that
[w]e have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal
jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather
than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court
sits.
Id. at 113.
163. See, e.g., Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1985)
(securities fraud action); Gilson v. Republic of Ir., 682 F.2d 1022, 1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") suit); Gemini Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade
Org. for Chem. & Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1981) (FSIA); Texas Trading & Milling
Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 314-15 (2d Cir. 1981) (FSIA); Newport
Components, Inc. v. NEC Home Elec. (U.S.A.), Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(antitrust suit); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 628 F. Supp. 599, 606-07 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(FSIA suit); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethi., 616
F. Supp. 660, 665 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (FSIA); Paulson Inv. Co. v. Norbay Secs., Inc., 603 F. Supp.
615, 618 (D. Or. 1984) (securities action); Bankers Trust Co. v. Worldwide Transp. Servs., Inc.,
537 F. Supp. 1101, 1109-10 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (FSIA); Eng'g Equip. Co. v. S.S. "Selene," 446 F.
Supp. 706, 709-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (admiralty suit); Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973) (patent infringement action); Holt v. Klosters
Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (admiralty suit); Alco Standard Corp. v.
Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (rescission of stock purchase agreement).
164. See Degnan & Kane, supra note 133.
165. Of course, whether the Web site was in English or not would play an important role in
determining whether the alien defendant could assume that many of his viewers are Americans.
Many Web browsers look only for sites that are in the language of its users; it does not produce
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But remember here that although Party X's Web site can be
viewed anywhere in the world, including Virginia, there is no
evidence that anyone in the forum, or in the nation as a whole besides
the plaintiff who may or may not be from Virginia, has actually
viewed or purchased something from MyKindaMusicOnline.com. It
is tempting to look to a stream of commerce theory to impute upon
the defendant an intention to ultimately contact the United States.
Justice O'Connor seemed to leave room for a "stream-plus" theory of
commercial contacts in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior
Court.166 But the plus required is not merely additional contact but
some meaningful direction of the stream at the outset.167  It is
possible, though arguable, that Party X's domain name registration in
our hypothetical forum, in addition to her knowledge that her
solicitations and/or goods could find their way to the forum
(especially on a national basis), could satisfy the stream-plus
approach. A better argument would include not only the stream-plus
approach, but also other several factors, which are described below.
2. Relation to the Cause of Action
An important exception that several courts have drawn from
Shaffer predicates upon Justice Marshall's statement regarding the
cases that he felt the Court's holding would presumably and most
notably affect: "cases where the property which now serves as the
basis for state-court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the
plaintiff's cause of action."' 16 The property attached in Shaffer was
not the "subject matter" of the litigation, nor was the "underlying
cause of action related to the property. ' 169 Several courts have held
that where the property upon which quasi in rem jurisdiction is
premised bears a relationship to the litigation, even though slight,
Shaffer does not apply. 170
a list of hits that are in any other language. Therefore, if the language of the Web site was not
English, a defendant could assume that a higher percentage of hits will come from some country
other than one in which English is the primary language.
166. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
167. Justice O'Connor suggested that this meaningfully directed contact might take the form
of "designing the product for the market in the forum State," "advertising in the forum State,"
"establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State," or
"marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the
forum State." Id. at 112.
168. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977).
169. Id. at 214.
170. See John N. John, Jr., Inc. v. Brahma Petroleum Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (W.D.
La. 1988); Long v. Baldt, 464 F. Supp. 269, 273-74 (D.S.C. 1979); Papendick v. Bosch, 410 A.2d
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This suggests a per se rule that supports quasi in rem jurisdiction
wherever there is some conceivable relation between property of a
certain nature and the subject matter of the cause of action. Such a
rule would give deference to the traditional notion that property
ownership itself intimates some intention of the putative defendant to
direct its contacts towards the forum, thereby purposefully availing
itself of the benefits of the forum. Justice Scalia, in Burnham v.
Superior Court, characterized the holding in Shaffer not as an
application of the minimum contacts test, but rather, as an application
of the principle of relatedness that embodies traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice. 7' But the brief look above at the
history of jurisdictional jurisprudence sheds light on the relatedness
factor which Justice Scalia found controlling in Burnham and Shaffer.
The traditional factors of jurisdiction were predicated not on
limitations of sovereign power, but rather on a judgment creditor's
ability to enforce a judgment in some other forum. The secondary or
enforcing forum focused on issues of natural rights, one of which was
the existence vel non of notice to the defendant of the original matter
that informed him that there was to be an adjudication that could
affect the disposition of his property. Traditionally, notice, in actions
quasi in rem, came both from the attachment of property and from
the defendant's original action of placing the property in the forum in
the first place. In recognition of this first kind of notice, Justice
Stevens stated in Shaffer that "[t]hroughout our history the
acceptable exercise of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction has
included a procedure giving reasonable assurance that actual notice
of the particular claim will be conveyed to the defendant.' 1 72 Justice
Stevens identified the second kind of notice: "The requirement of fair
notice also, I believe, includes fair warning that a particular activity
may subject a person to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.' 173
The relatedness requirement acts much the same as this second
form of notice or fair warning: the act of putting property in the
148, 152 (Del. 1979); Majique Fashions v. Warwick, 414 N.Y.S.2d 916, 921 (N.Y. 1979).
171. 495 U.S. 604, 620 (1990) ("Shaffer, like International Shoe, involved jurisdiction over an
absent defendant, and it stands for nothing more than the proposition that when the 'minimum
contact' that is a substitute for physical presence consists of property ownership it must, like
other minimum contacts, be related to the litigation."). Justice Scalia also reasoned that "quasi
in rem jurisdiction, i.e., that form of in personam jurisdiction based upon a 'property ownership'
contact and by definition unaccompanied by personal, in-state service, must satisfy the
litigation-relatedness requirement of International Shoe." Id. at 621.
172. 433 U.S. at 217-18 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 218.
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forum should constitute fair warning that the forum of the property's
location may in the future assert jurisdiction over that very property.
Thus, our use of relatedness today is merely a sophisticated evolution
of the traditional notice requirement: we require both the "act of
ownership" notice plus "fair warning" notice that comes from
ownership of a particular kind of property, property of such nature
that its owner would naturally assume it to be within the adjudicatory
province of the forum in which it lies17 4 The per se rule suggested
above, which considers any conceivable relation between the
property and the cause of action, better represents the notion that
notice is fundamental to jurisdiction.
Here, the character of the property at issue is what is under
analysis, not the character of the defendant's alleged contacts with the
forum generally. This is a subtle but important distinction: the
fundamental factor of analysis should be the character of the
property, not on the defendant's forum contacts that property
ownership is meant to symbolically represent. This analysis better
isolates that of which the defendant is, or should be, by virtue of
property ownership itself, fully cognizant and fairly warned. His
ownership of such a specific kind of property that is located in the
forum may give rise to an assertion of jurisdiction by the forum court.
Using this per se, fact-specific mode of analyzing the character of
the property, the propriety of asserting quasi in rem jurisdiction over
Party X's domain name is evident. A domain name is of paramount
importance to its registrant and user. It is every Web site's most
identifiable feature. It acts as an advertisement, a billboard, a calling
card, a phone number, an address, a store-front window, and a
common name. The importance and practical geographic
permanence of the domain name should reasonably apprise Party X
of the possibility that the forum in which her chosen domain name
registrar resides has an interest in regulating the continuing obligation
of the registrar. As indicated above, the registration of the domain
name is performed through a forum corporation. It is in the forum
that that registrar maintains and governs the use and functionality of
the domain name. The forum corporation has actual control over the
174. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring):
I would explicitly reserve judgment, however, on whether the ownership of some forms
of property whose situs is indisputably and permanently located within a State may,
without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a defendant to jurisdiction
within the State to the extent of the value of the property.
Id.; see also Cameco Indus. v. Mayatrac, S.A., 789 F. Supp. 200 (D. Md. 1992) (supporting a
lesser showing of minimum contacts for actions quasi in rem).
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use and transmission of the domain name. Party X depends upon the
laws of the forum to protect her interest in the domain name.
This kind of practical notice would not result where Party X
owned any other kind of property. Consider, for example, an analysis
of Party X's vacation property that happens to lie in Virginia. The
permanent nature of the real property should put Party X on notice
that ownership of the property may give rise to certain liabilities that
relate to the property. Party X should reasonably expect that
Virginia has enacted an administration of law that will certainly affect
her property interest. However, Party X's vacation property bears no
relationship with Party Y's breach of contract claim. Party X's
ownership or use of the vacation property did not give rise to Party
Y's claim. Here, then, quasi in rem jurisdiction should not lie.
That Party X may, as described above, in effect, take her domain
name to some other registrar supports the notion that she has chosen
the forum in which she contracts for registration services. Party X has
invested in an ongoing and continuing relationship with the forum
corporation, a relationship that is the foundation of her entire
commercial enterprise. Without the domain name, Party X would
have no way to engage in her chosen business. The domain name, by
its very nature, is inexorably linked to the commercial transactions
that it facilitates. Thus, the relationship between the domain name
and the commercial transaction that gave rise to Party Y's cause of
action is great, and surely is enough to give Party X fair warning that
a forum court may assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over the domain
name in a cause of action that stemmed from Party X's use of that
very property.
Notice that this analysis considers only those claims that arise
from use of the domain name. Another claim against Party X by
someone other than Party Y that did not arise from Party X's use of
the site would not manifest the same notice-giving relation. For
example, in a suit against Party X by a Virginia resident who claims
that Party X failed to pay for a magazine subscription she ordered
over the telephone from a Virginia publishing company, the breach of
contract claim would not have arisen from Party X's ownership or use
of her Virginia-registered domain name. Thus, the Virginia




Courts regularly analyze the relationship between the property
and the cause of action (as opposed to the contact and the forum).171
In John N. John, Jr., Inc. v. Brahma Petroleum Corp., the plaintiff
hauled property for the defendant to a storage facility located in
forum.7 6 The court asserted quasi in rem jurisdiction over that
property in the claim for payment of services rendered partly on
grounds that "the property attached is the very subject of the cause of
action.' ' 77 In Holt v. Holt, the defendant bought forum real estate
after a divorce decree was entered in a foreign state.'78 The plaintiff
alleged that the purchase of that property prevented the defendant
from honoring the foreign divorce decree (by decreasing his ability to
pay alimony), and brought an action quasi in rem against the forum
property. 79  The North Carolina Appellate Court upheld the
assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction, reasoning that although there
was no direct relationship between the property and the cause of
action, the purchase of that property was related enough to support
quasi in rem jurisdiction. 80
Even if we employ the relatedness test as used to analyze the
assertion of in personam jurisdiction, quasi in rem jurisdiction may
withstand constitutional scrutiny. One test that has emerged for
judging whether forum contacts are related to the cause of action is
the "but for" test. 81 In Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., the
plaintiff filed a Washington state negligence suit for injuries received
while on defendant's ocean vessel which was cruising in international
waters. 82 The Washington supreme court upheld in personam
175. See Papendick v. Bosch, 410 A.2d 148 (Del. 1979). In Papendick, plaintiff sued to
collect a finder's fee that was payment for the service of locating a piece of real estate in the
forum that defendant could and did acquire. The real estate was attached for the purpose of
quasi in rem jurisdiction after defendant refused to pay. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld
the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction based upon a reasonableness analysis that took into
account the size and strength of the defendant corporation as compared to the plaintiff. See id.
176. 699 F. Supp. 1220, 1222 (1988).
177. Id.
178. 41 N.C. App. 344, 353-54 (1979).
179. See id.
180. See id. at 352 ("[Glranted, there is no direct relation between the parties' separation
agreement and divorce decree entered in Missouri and the real property owned by the
defendant in North Carolina.... Here, however, we believe that the controversy Does [sic] have
'some relation' to the North Carolina real estate owned by defendant.").
181. See Mark M. Maloney, Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the "Arise from or Relate to"
Requirement... What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265, 1277 (1993); Stan Mayo,
Note, Specific Jurisdiction: Time for a "Related to" Analysis, 4 REV. LITIG. 341, 342-43 (1985);
Rose, supra note 132, passim; Dennis G. Terez, The Misguided Helicopteros Case: Confusion in
the Courts over Contacts, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 913, 934 n.ll0 (1995); Twitchell, supra note 8, at
663 n.234.
182. 897 F.2d 377, 385-86 (1990).
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jurisdiction over the defendant on the grounds that had the defendant
never advertised in the state of Washington, plaintiffs would have
never purchased cruise tickets, and that this constituted the requisite
degree of relatedness for specific jurisdiction. 8 3 The Supreme Court
reversed the decision on grounds that the forum selection clause that
was printed on the tickets was controlling, but did not comment on
the lower court's standard for relatedness.' 84
The standard in Carnival Cruise Lines would support quasi in
rem jurisdiction in our hypothetical. The argument is obvious: but for
Party X's registration of the domain name in the forum, Party Y
would never have attempted to purchase anything from Party X. This
line of analysis, in the context of the argument above, should be
sufficient to support jurisdiction.
3. Jurisdiction by Necessity
The Court's Shaffer opinion suggests another argument for quasi
in rem jurisdiction over our hypothetical case between X and Y.
Justice Marshall asserted: "we therefore do not consider, the question
whether the presence of a defendant's property in a State is a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction when no other forum is available to the
plaintiff." 185 Several courts have held that where there is no other
forum in which to bring suit, the assertion of jurisdiction is
"necessary" and Shaffer does not apply. 186
The basic theory of jurisdiction by necessity is that where there
appears to be no other forum in which to bring a claim, U.S courts
may entertain the litigation. In practice, however, jurisdiction by
necessity acts more as a fudge factor, where the defendant's contacts
appear to be slightly shy of the constitutional mark as drawn by the
traditional analysis of International Shoe. And so it was in Perkins v.
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., where the defendant, a Philippine
mining company that lied dormant as a result of Japanese occupation
during World War II, was sued in Ohio. 187 Though the defendant
engaged in very little activity in the forum state (the company
president had several management meetings and drew several
183. Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 78 (1989).
184. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
185. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,211 n.37 (1977).
186. See Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605
F.2d 648, 655 (2d Cir. 1979); Louring v. Kuwait Boulder Shipping Co., 455 F. Supp. 630, 633
(1977).
187. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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paychecks in Ohio), the Court allowed Ohio to assert jurisdiction
because the in-state activity suggested that such an imposition was
reasonable. 88 Implicit in the Court's analysis was that because the
defendant's principal place of business was located in Japan, the only
forum available to the plaintiff was that of Ohio; jurisdiction was
necessary because there was no other forum available.
Jurisdiction by necessity makes sense in the context of Shaffer's
discussion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Justice Marshall
downplayed the importance of quasi in rem where a plaintiff sought
to prevent the defendant from removing property from the forum in
order to shield the property from the plaintiff. Marshall reasoned
that the Constitution would not forbid the attachment of property
quasi in rem where a plaintiff sought to enforce or secure a judgment
that was already or could be entered in a court that could
constitutionally assert in personam jurisdiction.89 In other words,
where there has already been entered a valid judgment by a court that
has constitutionally asserted in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant, the Constitution does not forbid the plaintiff from taking
that judgment to the state where the defendant's property lies.
Indeed, the Full Faith and Credit Clause arms the plaintiff with the
constitutional authority to do just that. Therefore, as Shaffer implies,
the necessity of asserting jurisdiction in a forum with which the
defendant has maintained constitutionally insufficient contacts is
quite unapparent. In essence, the Court says: "Go somewhere else
first, then come back!"
The obvious corollary to this is that where there is no forum that
could constitutionally assert jurisdiction over the defendant at the
outset, where the plaintiff is unable to find a forum that satisfies the
International Shoe test, the Full Faith and Credit Clause can play no
meaningful role. The plaintiff cannot go somewhere else first because
there is no where else to go. Therefore, the assertion of jurisdiction
in the forum at issue evinces a greater degree of necessity.
188. See id. at 448.
189. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 210.
[The] [s]tate in which property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that
property, by use of proper procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in a
forum where the litigation can be maintained consistently with International Shoe.
Moreover, we know of nothing to justify the assumption that a debtor can avoid paying
his obligations by removing his property to a State in which his creditor cannot obtain
personal jurisdiction over him. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, after all, makes the
valid in personam judgment of one State enforceable in all other States.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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But some courts have suggested that this jurisdiction by necessity
might apply only where there is no other forum anywhere in the
world. Dicta in Justice Blackmun's opinion in Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall seems to bolster this argument:
We conclude, however, that respondents failed to carry their
burden of showing that all three defendants could not be sued
together in a single forum. It is not clear from the record, for
example, whether suit could have been brought against all three
defendants in either Colombia or Peru. We decline to consider
adoption of a doctrine of jurisdiction by necessity-a potentially
far-reaching modification of existing law-in the absence of a more
complete record. 190
However, this argument does not apply to our hypothetical case
simply because Party Y may never discover Party X's true identity.191
"Necessity" in our case does not derive from a lack of a
constitutionally suitable forum, though jurisdiction over the
defendant, at least during the initial stages of litigation, is necessary
nonetheless. Like a proceeding against an unnamed party, our John
Doe-type hypothetical allows the plaintiff to take affirmative steps in
resolving the situation that gave rise to the litigation, without the
burden of first identifying the defendant specifically. Unlike a John
Doe proceeding, however, our hypothetical allows the added security
of attaching property of the defendant, which in turn, increases the
chance that notice of the suit will reach the defendant, and that the
plaintiff will receive at least something for his litigation troubles.
The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,192  as
described earlier, seizes upon this same necessity extant where a party
is unable to discover the identity of the wrongdoer. The statute
requires, in an apparent appeal to necessity as described above, that
the court first find that it could have asserted in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant were he or she present within the forum, or that
after a diligent attempt to locate and give notice to the putative
defendant, the trademark holder is unable to discern the identify of
the registrant of the allegedly infringing domain name.193
For example, if our Party Y was himself an owner of a chain of
record stores famous for its creative name, MyKindaMusicOnHand,
190. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13 (1984).
191. See Porsche v. Porsche.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (E.D. Va. 1999) (observing that
some owners of domain names are unable to be found and that in personam proceedings against
such persons may be fruitless).
192- See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1999).
193. Id.; see also Steve R. Borgman, The New Federal Cybersquatting Laws, 8 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 265, 271 (2000).
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and if that name was a registered trademark, Party Y would have
available to him the vehicle of the ACPA for enforcing his trademark
rights against an allegedly infringing domain name. If Party Y could
demonstrate that, after a diligent attempt to locate and give notice to
the operator of a Web site with the domain name www.MyKinda-
MusicOnline.com, he is unable to identify the owner of the allegedly
infringing domain name, Party Y can attach that domain name. Upon
this property, a court would be authorized by the ACPA to assert in
rem jurisdiction. With regard to necessity, the general procedures
authorized by the ACPA and proposed in this Note are quite similar.
However, notice that because the underlying issue in a claim of
trademark infringement is that of who rightly owns and may use the
mark itself, the ACPA authorizes only in rem jurisdiction for the
purpose of restoring the mark to its rightful owner. In
contradistinction, the original hypothetical contemplates the attach-
ment of a domain name for the more limited purpose of identifying
the owner of the allegedly breaching www.MyKindaMusic-
Online.com, with an end toward pressuring him or her to appear in
court.
4. Reasonableness
In an appeal to the most fundamental level of jurisdictional
analysis, where there is no other forum in which to bring suit for one
reason or another, an assertion of jurisdiction may be reasonable
even given the dearth of constitutionally meaningful contacts with the
forum. Since Virginia is the state in which NSI is incorporated, a
reasonableness analysis must also include Virginia's interest in
resolving a dispute against a domain name registrant.194 Claims
involving Virginia residents involve an obvious Virginia interest in
the protection of its residents. However, even where our plaintiff,
Party Y, resides elsewhere, Virginia still has an interest in claims that
arise from Party X's transaction with NSI, a Virginia corporation.
With regard to Party Y's desire for convenient and effective
relief,195 Virginia is a reasonable forum, especially since the plaintiff's
choice of forum is already severely limited to the one state in which
the defendant owns property (the domain name).196 That there exists
194. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
195. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
196. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977); see also World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290 (1980).
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only one forum in which this particular necessity argument plausibly
lies should significantly mollify the understandable reluctance to
allowing what might otherwise be a far-reaching exception to the
minimum contacts standard. The exclusive nature of domain name
registration precludes the kind of forum shopping against which the
Court militated in Helicopteros.
197
The discussion of "fair warning" above applies also to an analysis
of Party X's reasonable expectation of being hailed into the forum
state. 98  NSI's domain name registration agreement should
reasonably put any registrant on notice that the state of Virginia may
play some role in domain name registration. 199 All domain name
registrants should be aware that NSI is a Virginia corporation, and
that payment is due to the Virginia corporation annually.2°° This
suggests that the defendant's activities were not "random,"
"fortuitous," or "attenuated. '20  Moreover, the defendant's contact
with the forum (registration with NSI) was not due to a "unilateral
activity of another party or a third person." 2°2  Because NSI's
registration agreement indicates that registrants shall pay an annual
fee, the defendant's contact with NSI can legitimately be
characterized as a "continuing obligation. '20 3 Also, Virginia state laws
create "benefits and protections" of which any domain name
registrant could avail himself.204 All of these factors, though relevant
to the initial question of contacts, play a modulating role in a
reasonableness analysis as well. More than anything else, however,
all of the factors above that appeal to reasonableness in one way or
another must necessarily comport with the way the Internet works, as
well as with the existing jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction.
Reasonableness, in other words, must derive from an analysis of
the public policy interests perceivable in the current legal landscape,
especially where the Court's last word on quasi in rem jurisdiction
came from a world of commerce many revolutions prior to the wired
world in which the law now operates. When Shaffer was decided, it
appeared that the minimum contacts analysis provided for the
197. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984).
198. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216.
199. See NSI-Registration License and Agreement, supra note 56.
200. See id.
201. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
202. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417.
203. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 470 (1985); Travelers Health Ass'n




adequate protection of state interests and that quasi in rem was no
longer as useful as it once had been. 05 As described above, Justice
Marshall asserted that many types of actions that had been quasi in
rem would be unaffected by the holding in Shaffer 2 6 Indeed, several
commentators and lower courts had predicted the fall of quasi in rem
jurisdiction even before Shaffer was handed down.2 7  Some
commentators welcomed the holding in Shaffer as a change for the
better, and others argue now that quasi in rem jurisdiction is no more




However, the advent of the Internet and the great proliferation
of Internet transactions have changed the legal landscape. At the
very least, and perhaps as a last resort, quasi in rem jurisdiction would
allow a single forum in which to seek relief. Indeed, without a
modicum of reassurance that operators of Web sites will be held to
their online promises, it is doubtful whether the Internet will blossom
to its full potential. This "last resort" quasi in rem action might serve
as a "silent veto" of the malicious or negligent actions of Web
administrators. If Web administrators know that their sites could be
shut down by a valid claim in Virginia, it follows that they would be
deterred from illegal or tortious online activity. Moreover, such
power in the hands of consumers would provide some balance where
now, as a result of our increasingly electronically mechanized and
anonymous world, there is little.
5. Caveat
Suing a domain name quasi in rem, along with the obvious
limitations concomitant to the necessity and reasonableness
requirements above, may involve other important limitations. First,
where a domain name is also a trademark, registered or otherwise, it
is doubtful that a court would award the name to a party who is
neither the trademark registrant nor able to evidence a colorable
claim to the domain name.2 9 A transferring of a trademarked domain
205. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977).
206. See id. at 208-09.
207. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958); U.S. Indus., Inc. v.
Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3 d Cir. 1976); Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1130-43 (3d Cir.
1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Bekins v. Huish, 401 P.2d 743 (Ariz. Ct. App. i965); Atkinson
v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957); Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 281 (1976).
208. Holly S. Haskew, Shaffer, Burnham, and New York's Continuing Use of QIR-2
Jurisdiction: A Resurrection of the Power Theory, 45 EMORY L.J. 239 (1996); Mushlin, supra
note 110, at 1059.
209. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Intermatic,
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name to one who is not the registrant would instantly cast the
judgment creditor in the role of cybersquatter. The judgment
creditor would be in violation of federal trademark law for simply
holding the domain name. Moreover, the judgment creditor would be
unable to legally transfer it to anyone else who was likewise not the
registered mark holder.
210
Another limitation relates to the value a domain name
represents to its owner. A domain name may represent value by
virtue of its obvious meaning; the domain name "buysocks.com"
conveys a clear expression of what one might find on the associated
Web site.211  Assume that the owner of the domain name
understandably registered the domain name because of its innate
ability, and that lots of other Web entrepreneurs could and would
take advantage of it similarly. Because the domain name is
comprised of generic terms, it is less likely that trademark rights have
accrued as a result of its use, even if the domain name has come to
represent valuable goodwill. If the original Web site fails, the domain
name owner may sell the name to another in the field of hosiery (or in
a completely different field). In this situation, then, the domain name
owner may very well be pressured to come to court were his or her
domain name rendered inoperable by an allegedly aggrieved seller.
However, the same is not true where a domain name represents
little value to its owner. Where a Web administrator depends upon
registered users who rely upon frequent e-mail contact, and where the
content of the Web site bears little relationship to the domain name, a
Web site operator may simply change the domain name with little
disruption. This is especially true because the Web site operator is
able to contact users directly in order to inform them of the name
change. Were the Web site operator to find that his or her domain
name had been rendered inoperable, he or she could simply register a
new domain name and send this to registered users. Unquestionably,
many Web sites hold a stock of domain names dormant for similar
purposes. Here again, an action quasi in rem may offer little utility.
Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Il. 1996).
210. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Intermatic,
Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227 (N.D. Il. 1996).




The advent of the Internet, and of a new economy in which
commercial activities are commenced in ways far different from
traditional methods, is analogous to the advent of maritime activity,
and should, in turn, give rise to a new regime of jurisdictional
jurisprudence that is tailored to the exigencies and vagaries of
international electronic commerce.1 2 Just as the law and procedures
of traditional civil actions were inadequate to provide for an equitable
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction in causes of action that stemmed
from maritime activities, the law of traditional civil actions cannot
adequately provide for a comprehensive theory of jurisdiction in
causes of action that stem from electronic commerce.
However, electronic commerce is different than commercial
maritime activities in an important way: there is no real ability for
electronic commercial actors to avoid real commercial contacts with
any specific part of the world. Without a comprehensive regime of
physical borders on the Internet, electronic commercial actors can
generally do nothing to avoid contact with a specific jurisdiction. It
would be a direct assault on a traditional interest- allowing a
commercial actor to tailor its commercial activities in such a way as to
limit its amenability to suit-to merely subject a defendant to
jurisdiction anywhere his or her Web page could be seen (the
practical equivalent of asserting jurisdiction anywhere where there is
a plaintiff that had been harmed by an online electronic commercial
action). Maritime law may provide some insight into the creation of a
method whereby electronic victims can seek redress. The registration
of a domain name, like the docking of a ship at a forum pier in order
to take on fuel and supplies, manifests a physical and direct contact
with an island among seas, where an aggrieved plaintiff could identify
the defendant or his goods, thereby calling him to a forum of law, and
by the same procedure, could levy upon a specific property interest as
security for any judgment that may result.
The most vexing hurdle of legal vindication is often the initial
step of identifying the defendant and his property. Often times, a
Whois search produces only a string of false personal information.
Without further investigation, at considerable cost to the plaintiff, the
case is effectively dead in the water. However, the attachment of the
defendant's domain name would immediately accomplish two things.
212. See Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1095, 1112 (1996).
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First, it would give notice to the defendant that the plaintiff has filed
suit against it. Its immediate inability to operate the Web site would
quickly inform it of, at a minimum, the fact that its domain name is no
longer being listed on the top registry. Faced with this predicament, it
has a choice of doing nothing, in which case, its e-business is out of
business, or contacting its domain name registrar to ascertain the
status of the domain name. The registrar would inform it that after
receiving a writ of attachment, the registrar was compelled to deposit
the domain name with the court registry.
The defendant's next action would serve the second main
purpose of pretrial attachment. In maritime attachments and arrest,
and in the attachment procedures of many state courts, the trial judge
has discretion in requiring the plaintiff to post a bond that would
compensate the defendant for wrongful arrest or attachment.
Moreover, the attachment and arrest procedures of both maritime
and state law guarantee that the defendant's due process rights are
not violated by virtue of immediate hearings after attachment or
arrest to provide the defendant with an opportunity to argue against
the plaintiff's case. In order to get its domain name out of hoc, the
defendant would have to post bond or other security or stipulation to
the plaintiff. 13 This would guarantee that the plaintiff would find
compensation, albeit possibly limited and insufficient, by virtue of the
collateral bond.
In this age of free access to information via the information
superhighway, it is increasingly important that those who transact
business on the Internet have a forum in which to seek judicial
remedy.2 14 The use of one of the most traditional bases of jurisdiction,
quasi in rem jurisdiction, may help provide such a forum. Although
the Supreme Court has limited most applications of quasi in rem to
instances in which the minimum contacts requirements of
International Shoe are met, Shaffer preserved several important
applications of quasi in rem. Several state courts have upheld the
assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction based upon these exceptions.
Moreover, Shaffer did not speak to situations in which there may be
no alternative forum in which resolve a dispute. These exceptions
support the assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction against a domain
name in the forum in which the domain name registrar is located.
213. See Rutherglen, supra note 90, at 551 (describing release of property upon bond or
other stipulation in maritime arrest and attachment).
214. See Henry H. Peritt, Jr., Will the Judgment-Proof Own Cyberspace?, 32 INT'L L. 1121
(1998).
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Moreover, an analysis of traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice suggests that the assertion of quasi in rem
jurisdiction would not violate the defendant's due process rights.
The proposed action may not adequately compensate all
plaintiffs.215 However, the ability to assert jurisdiction over a domain
name would present some plaintiffs with a forum for the redress of
Internet wrongs where before there was none. Although defendants
would be liable for no personal assets other than the domain name,
the loss of the domain name itself may serve as an adequate deterrent
to online impropriety. The first successful action quasi in rem against
a domain name would effectively express the message that online
mischief can lead to the loss of one's Web site.216 This message may
be more effective in promoting Internet use than broader bandwidth
or cheaper home computers in that Internet users will know that, if all
else fails, they may seek a remedy in the forum in which a domain
name is located.
215. Id.
216. See Henry H. Peritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1, 34 (1996).
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